In a global economy, a country's international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation. Under conditions of partial capital mobility, governments are more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. This argument is tested empirically through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in 20 OECD countries from 1974 to 2000.
Introduction
Scholars have long argued that governments are more likely to be reelected in good times than in bad. 1 What is more contentious is what, if anything, incumbents can do to engineer "good times". One of the most commonly available tools attributed to the government for manufacturing good times prior to an election is fiscal manipulation-spending more or taxing less prior to an election. When governments manipulate fiscal policy depends upon the domestic institutional, political and economic context of each election, as has been demonstrated through both single country and cross-national studies. 2 With the exception of Clark and Hallerberg (2000) and Clark (2002) , the key variables of interest in these studies have almost all been domestic, with little attention paid to how international variables may affect the likelihood of fiscal manipulation.
In a global economy increasingly characterized by cross-border trade and capital flows, the assumption that international economic ties do not impinge upon a government's decision to manipulate fiscal policy becomes difficult to justify. In this paper, I redress the balance between domestic and international explanations by exploring how a country's international economic relations influence the government's decision to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. I argue that a country's economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation.
In particular, the government's decision to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is mediated by a country's monetary and trade relations with the rest of the world. Whether or not a government manipulates fiscal policy prior to an election depends upon the combination of a country's exchange rate regime and its exposure to international trade. 3 I argue that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is most likely to occur when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. Conversely, governments are less likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade.
Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation and international economic ties: The argument in brief A country's trade and monetary relations with the rest of the world affect both how desirable preelectoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how effective pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is in increasing the government's chances of re-election. International trade acts as a conduit for international economic volatility. While governments may already desire pre-electoral fiscal manipulation to offset economic shocks originating in the domestic economy, exposure to international shocks amplifies their demand for fiscal manipulation. As a country becomes more open to international trade, the likelihood that economic shocks will be imported into the domestic economy increases. This is problematic for governments because greater exposure to economic shocks increases the uncertainty of good times prior to the election, increasing the uncertainty that the government will win, thus increasing the government's desire to manipulate fiscal policy. Therefore, as a country's trade openness increases, governments' desire to manipulate fiscal policy prior to an election will also increase.
While a country's trade ties may increase the government's desire to engage in fiscal manipulation in the run up to an election, a country's monetary ties affect the effectiveness of doing so.
How flexible a country's exchange rate is, in combination with international capital mobility, affects the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation. As Clark and Hallerberg (2000) argue, when capital is fully mobile internationally a flexible exchange rate renders fiscal manipulation ineffective; that is, fiscal manipulation will have no effect on aggregate economic growth. As a result, when capital is fully mobile and the exchange rate is flexible, governments will never engage in fiscal manipulation. However, while the postBretton Woods period is characterized by relatively high levels of capital mobility, capital is not fully mobile. When capital is partially mobile, increased exchange rate flexibility reduces the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation. As a result, as the flexibility of the exchange rate increases, the likelihood of fiscal manipulation decreases, all else equal. Therefore, when the exchange rate is flexible, governments will only engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the benefit of doing so is high. Because the benefit of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation increases in trade openness, under a flexible exchange rate governments are only likely to manipulate fiscal policy when trade openness is high.
In contrast, while the government can quite effectively manipulate fiscal policy when the exchange rate is fixed, fiscal manipulation under a fixed exchange rate will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which in turn reduces domestic producers' international competitiveness. While reducing international competitiveness will have little effect on the domestic economy if the economy is relatively unexposed to international trade, as the country's international trade openness increases, the loss of international competitiveness will offset the benefit of fiscal manipulation. As a result, under a fixed exchange rate regime, governments become less willing to manipulate fiscal policy as their country's international openness increases. Hence, when the exchange rate is fixed, governments will only manipulate fiscal policy when trade openness is low. These expectations are delineated in Figure 1 , and explored in more detail in the next two sections. A more formal exposition of this argument is presented in the Appendix.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Exchange rate flexibility and the effectiveness of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange rate flexibility affects both the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation in increasing aggregate economic performance and the distributive impact of fiscal manipulation on the domestic economy. With respect to the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation in increasing aggregate economic performance, Clark and Hallerberg (2000, 326) argue that "when capital becomes mobile…fiscal policy is effective only when exchange rates are fixed". The logic driving this argument stems from a Mundell-
Fleming perspective to open economy analyses and rests upon a series of assumptions embedded within the Mundell-Fleming perspective "in which prices are held constant, capital is fully mobile, and the shortterm effects of policy are ignored" (326, fn12). The problem with these assumptions is that in the real world prices are not held constant, capital is not fully mobile, and the short-term effects of policy are vitally important when one examines the government's preference for manipulating the economy in the run-up to an election-an inherently short-term effect.
If capital is viewed as partially rather than fully mobile, a view that is more reflective of the reality of the last few decades, increased exchange rate flexibility does not render fiscal manipulation fully ineffective but simply reduces its effectiveness. When fiscal manipulation is completely ineffective, governments will not use it; when fiscal manipulation is less effective, it will only be used when the benefit of doing so outweighs the cost. The cost of fiscal manipulation can be reckoned both in terms of a budget constraint and an audience cost. Money spent on fiscal manipulation prior to an election reduces the amount available for other purposes either before or after the election. Moreover, as the incumbent spends more to induce a pre-electoral fiscal expansion, the likelihood that their actions will be noticed and punished by voters increases; that this cost is effective in disciplining incumbents is supported by Alt and Lassen's (2006) finding that the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation declines as transparency increases.
As fiscal manipulation becomes less effective, a higher level of fiscal manipulation is required to increase the government's chances of reelection, thus increasing the cost of fiscal manipulation as a tool of political expediency. Therefore, by reducing the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation, exchange rate flexibility increases the costliness of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. As a result, I expect that in a world of partial capital mobility, all else equal, the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation decreases as exchange rate flexibility increases, and governments will only engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the benefit of doing so is relatively high. I argue that, when the exchange rate is flexible, trade openness creates the added incentive that spurs governments to engage in fiscal manipulation prior to an election.
Political economy scholars have not considered how trade openness affects pre-electoral fiscal manipulation, but how a country's international trade ties affect public expenditure more broadly is a large debate. From one perspective, trade openness and public expenditures are inversely related (the efficiency hypothesis). From another perspective, trade openness and public expenditures are positively correlated (the compensation hypothesis). 4 The reason for this divergence stems from how a country's trade ties affect both demand for and constraints on government spending.
While international trade openness may increase aggregate national income, it may also increase its volatility. Moreover, by creating new economic winners and losers, increased trade openness acts redistributively. 5 The compensation hypothesis posits that governments in countries that are highly open to international trade will maintain high levels of public expenditures to cushion the domestic economy from adverse international shocks (Rodrik 1998 ). 6 The role of public expenditures in this view is to act as a stabilizing force to smooth and redistribute aggregate income. As such, increased public expenditures reflect the "embedded liberalism" thesis upon which Ruggie (1982) argues developed democracies' macroeconomic policies are based. 7 Thus, under the compensation hypothesis, as trade openness increases, public expenditures will increase.
Alternatively, proponents of the efficiency hypothesis argue that, while high levels of international trade may increase the government's desire to cushion the economy, they reduce the government's ability to do so. This occurs because increased trade openness increases the domestic economy's exposure to international competitive pressures. As international competitive pressures increase, domestic producers are forced to produce goods more competitively. To do so, domestic producers must reduce their costs, and one key mechanism to do this is a reduction in their tax burden. As a result, increased trade openness will force governments to reduce taxes; reducing their tax revenue and leading to a reduction in public expenditures. Thus, under the efficiency hypothesis, as trade openness increases, public expenditures will decrease. 8 While empirical support for both arguments has been mixed due to differences in definitions, samples and methodology (Brune and Garrett 2005) , recent research appears to find stronger support for the compensation hypothesis than for the efficiency hypothesis (Hays et al. 2005, and Hicks and Zorn 2005) . Taken as a whole, the empirical results from this research agenda suggest that governments in countries that face higher levels of international volatility do appear to spend more money, but that when governments do so depends on the type of international volatility that the country faces (Burgoon 2001, Hays et al. 2005) , that governments do so within constraints (Garrett 1995) , and that they target where to increase expenditures (Hicks and Zorn 2005) . 9 These analyses have focused on the long run relationship between trade openness and public expenditures. However, when a government considers manipulating fiscal policy prior to an election, its time horizon is quite short. The short time horizon involved in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation further calls into question the explanatory power of the efficiency hypothesis. Because the efficiency hypothesis relies on the long run effect of public expenditures on domestic competitiveness, as the time horizon for increased public expenditures declines, any constraints on public expenditures imposed by trade openness will also decline. Thus, in the short run, increased trade openness increases the government's desire to manipulate fiscal policy, while constraints on the government's ability to do so are not as binding. As a result, as trade openness increases, the government's desire to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation as a mechanism for offsetting international volatility will increase (compensation effect). To the extent that the efficiency hypothesis does hold, pre-electoral fiscal manipulation will lead to an accentuation of the political budget cycle in which higher spending or lower taxes prior to an election are offset by lower spending or higher taxes after the election.
In sum, while exchange rate flexibility decreases the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation, strong trade ties make pre-electoral fiscal manipulation more valuable to the government. As a result, as the flexibility of the exchange rate increases, pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is only likely when trade openness is relatively high. This argument yields hypothesis 1; when the exchange rate is flexible, the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation increases in trade openness.
Exchange rate flexibility and the distributive impact of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation A country's exchange rate regime affects not only the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation, but also the distributive effect of fiscal manipulation on domestic economic actors. Under the MundellFleming perspective, fiscal manipulation under a fixed exchange rate is highly effective; as Clark and Hallerberg (2000: 326 fn11) note, "the reasoning is that fiscal expansion…leads to an increase in both income and interest rates. When capital is mobile, the rise in interest rates attracts capital, which leads to a currency appreciation. When the exchange rate is fixed, the central bank has to expand money supply to offset the effects of the capital inflow on the [nominal] exchange rate. Thus, under fixed exchange rates and mobile capital, a fiscal expansion induces a reinforcing monetary expansion."
When prices are held constant, as assumed under the Mundell-Fleming perspective, the benefit of fiscal manipulation and its concomitant monetary expansion is distributed equally across the economy.
However, when one recognizes that both the fiscal and monetary expansions lead to an increase in domestic prices, the analysis is no longer as straightforward. An increase in domestic prices under a fixed nominal exchange rate leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As the real exchange rate appreciates, it becomes more difficult for exporters to sell their goods abroad, while imports become relatively cheap vis-à-vis domestic goods. This suggests that, when the exchange rate is fixed, the benefit to the domestic economy of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation will be offset as domestic producers lose competitiveness vis-à-vis international competitors.
This effect is unimportant if the country is not involved in international trade, as the loss of international competitiveness has no effect when no actors are exposed to international competition. This effect does not exist when the exchange rate is flexible as changes in competitiveness will be reflected in changes in the nominal exchange rate. This effect will matter when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade. Based upon the appreciation of the real exchange rate that stems from fiscal manipulation, when the exchange rate is fixed, the effectiveness of preelectoral fiscal manipulation as a tool of political expediency will decrease as trade openness and the fixity of the exchange rate increase. As a result, I expect that, all else equal, the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation decreases as the fixity of the exchange rate and trade openness increase. This argument yields hypothesis 2; when the exchange rate is fixed, the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation decreases in trade openness.
To summarize the argument developed in this paper and couched in hypotheses 1 and 2, the government's decision to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation in a world of partial capital mobility is mediated by a country's exchange rate regime and level of economic openness. I expect that preelectoral fiscal manipulation is most likely to occur when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. Governments are less likely to engage in preelectoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade.
Empirical analysis
To test the two hypotheses that when the exchange rate is flexible, the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation increases in trade openness, and that when the exchange rate is fixed, the likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation decreases in trade openness, a proxy for fiscal manipulation, the dependent variable, is needed. In keeping with the extant literature on fiscal manipulation, the proxy for fiscal manipulation used in this paper is the Change in Gross Government Debt as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product. 10 This measure assumes that increases in government expenditure, or decreases in taxes, will be reflected in an increase in government debt. The key drawback of this measure is that, to the extent that governments can target fiscal expenditures, as discussed in Hicks and Zorn (2005) , fiscal manipulation may be less evident in such an aggregate measure. What this means is that using an aggregate measure for fiscal manipulation should reduce the likelihood of observing a significant level of fiscal manipulation, and thus make it more difficult to find support for the two hypotheses outlined above.
Another potential drawback of this measure is that it may be pro-cyclical-that is, when the economy is doing well government debt ought to decrease, all else equal. To control for cyclicality in the dependent variable, I include GDP Growth and Unemployment in the analyses as proxies for the strength of the economy. 11 I also include a lag of gross government debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (Government Debt as a % of GDP, lagged) to control for temporal stickiness in the government's fiscal stance.
The independent variables of interest in this model are Election, Exchange Rate, Trade Openness, and the interactions between these three variables. There are three Election measures used in these analyses. The first, All Elections is a dichotomous variable coded one in a year in which an election occurs, and zero otherwise. 12 The second two election variables identify "regular elections"; that is, elections that occur near the end of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP). The logic behind these measures is that, all else equal, fiscal manipulation is less likely when an election is early than when it occurs at the end of its constitutional inter-election period. There are two reasons for this. First, to the extent that governments call early elections when the economy is doing relatively well, or more specifically, when there is a belief that the economy will be doing less well later on, there is less need to manipulate the economy. Second, given that many early elections occur unexpectedly, it can also be argued that there will be less fiscal expansion prior to an early election as there is less time to plan before an early election.
The first regular election variable, Regular Elections 90% CIEP, is a dichotomous variable coded one in a year in which an election occurs if the election occurs in the last one-tenth of the constitutional inter-election period, and zero otherwise, and is coded by the author based upon data on constitutional election rules provided in Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003) , and from various national election sources.
Treating any elections that occur in the first 90% of the constitutional inter-election period as early mirrors the coding adopted in Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003, 166-67) . The benefit of this measure is that it controls for differences in countries' constitutional inter-election period while focusing on the election expectations that build in the last ten percent of the term. A key critique of this measure is that, because constitutional inter-election periods do vary across countries, the last ten percent of the constitutional inter-election period captures a different absolute amount of time across different countries. [ Table 1 about here]
Because the variables of interest in these regressions represent interactions rather than exogenous quantities, the coefficients and standard errors reported in Table 1 are insufficient to judge either the marginal effects of elections, exchange rates or trade ties, or their levels of significance. 19 To address this problem, I also report the predicted marginal effect of an election on government debt in a country with low trade ties (such as Japan) and a country that is more highly open to trade (such as Belgium) under fixed and flexible exchange rates for each model in Table 2 , and whether or not these marginal effects are significantly different from zero.
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[ -) ) are all in the predicted directions, none is significant. While an election may result in a two percent increase in government debt when the exchange rate is fixed and trade openness is low, as reported in Table 2 , this increase is not significantly different from the effect of an election when the exchange rate is flexible and trade openness is low or when the exchange rate is fixed and trade openness is high. Moreover, an election has no significant effect on government debt when the exchange rate is flexible and trade openness is high. The results from Model 1 provide scant support for hypothesis 2, and no support for hypothesis 1. However, I argue that the lack of support for these two hypotheses in Model 1 should not be construed as damning, but rather stems from the heterogeneity of elections included in All Elections. When only regular elections are considered, as in Models 2-5, there is substantial support for these two hypotheses.
Turning to Models 2 and 3, which analyze the effect of a regular election on fiscal manipulation, the variables of interest are both significant and in the hypothesized directions. For Model 2, which uses Regular Elections 90% CIEP, when the exchange rate is flexible and trade openness is high, a regular election results in a 7.3 percentage point increase in government debt; an increase that is significantly different from the effect of an election when the exchange rate is flexible and trade openness is low, and when the exchange rate is fixed and trade openness is high. This provides support for hypothesis 1.
Similarly, and in support of hypothesis 2, when the exchange rate is fixed and trade openness is low, an election results in a 3.6 percentage point increase in government debt, an increase that is also significantly greater than the effect of an election when the exchange rate is fixed and trade openness is high and when the exchange rate is flexible and trade openness is low. The results from Model 3, which uses Regular Turning to the non-election variables included in these models, government debt appears to be greatest when the exchange rate is not fixed and trade openness is low. Recalling that Flexible Exchange
Rate is the excluded category, the negative and significant coefficient on Fixed Exchange Rate suggests that government debt is lower when the exchange rate is fixed than when the exchange rate is flexible. Of the economic and political control variables, higher levels of government debt in the previous year appears to limit how much additional debt the government will take on this year, as captured by the negative coefficient for Government Debt as a % of GDP, lagged. Similarly, the better the economy is doing (as measured by GDP Growth), the less likely it is that the government will increase its indebtedness. In contrast, higher levels of Unemployment may make the government somewhat more likely to increase its debt, although this effect is only significant at the 90% level in three of the five regressions. Finally, the more conservative the government, as captured by Chief Executive's Party, the less likely the government is to increase government debt.
The insignificant coefficient for

Conclusion
Under conditions of partial capital mobility, governments are more likely to increase public expenditures prior to an election when the exchange rate is fixed and trade openness is low, and when the exchange rate is flexible and trade openness is high. These results stand in contrast to Clark and Hallerberg's (2000) finding that governments will not manipulate fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible, and will always manipulate fiscal policy when the exchange rate is fixed.
The difference between this analysis and previous research stems from the different assumptions made in each about the nature of capital mobility and domestic prices. Building upon a Mundell-Fleming framework, Clark and Hallerberg (2000) assume that capital is perfectly mobile and domestic prices are unaffected by fiscal manipulation. In contrast, the analysis in this paper assumes that capital is only partially mobile and that fiscal manipulation results in an increase in domestic prices. Based upon the empirical results reported in the previous section, these assumptions appear to comport better with reality than do the ones embedded within the Mundell-Fleming framework.
The Mundell-Fleming framework is a powerful workhorse for political economic analyses and has provided a simple, elegant framework for incorporating the international economic environment into our understanding of domestic macroeconomic policymaking. In particular, it has allowed scholars to better understand the tradeoffs governments face amongst their choice of macroeconomic policy tools. 23 One of the reasons that the Mundell-Fleming framework has played such an important role in political economic analyses is because it makes such stark assumptions about the world. These assumptions yield clear, empirically testable hypotheses. In light of the predictive power of these assumptions, it is important to analyze how changing these assumptions affects our hypotheses. The analysis in this paper is one attempt to do so, and is one demonstration of how relaxing these assumptions leads to alternative hypotheses. This paper is not a call to abandon the Mundell-Fleming framework, but rather is a call to look more critically at how the assumptions embedded within the framework shape the model's predictions. To the extent that these assumptions do not reflect reality, do they yield hypotheses that are also less reflective of reality? When they do, future research in political economy will require moving beyond the Mundell-Fleming framework.
These differences also have an important substantive effect, as can be seen through the two argument's implications for pre-electoral fiscal manipulation in the eurozone. To the extent that eurozone member states are characterized by high levels of trade openness, the argument forwarded in this paper suggests that, with the adoption of the euro, governments will be less likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. This stands in marked contrast to Clark and Hallerberg (2000) , which argues that with the adoption of the euro, eurozone members will be more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation.
More broadly for comparative politics, these results highlight the importance of taking into account the international environment in which domestic decisions are undertaken. 24 By looking only at domestic characteristics of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation, scholars implicitly assume that the macroeconomic costs and benefits of manipulating fiscal policy remain constant regardless of the country's international ties. While a more complete analysis of a government's decision to engage in preelectoral fiscal manipulation should take into account both domestic and international factors, the analysis in this paper clearly demonstrates that a country's international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation.
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Building upon the logic discussed in Section II, the model constructed in this section presents a government utility function for pre-electoral fiscal manipulation (U FM , shown in equation 1), in which the benefit accruing from fiscal manipulation (B) stems from trade openness, while the cost of fiscal manipulation (C) is a function of trade openness, capital mobility, and the flexibility of the exchange rate.
Based upon the compensation effect, pre-electoral fiscal manipulation becomes more valuable to the government as the domestic economy becomes more exposed to international volatility. As trade openness (T), and hence the domestic economy's exposure to international volatility, increases, the benefit the government derives from fiscal manipulation increases. This is captured in equation 2 There are two components to the cost of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation-the effectiveness effect of fiscal manipulation as exchange rate flexibility and capital mobility vary, and the real exchange rate appreciation effect of fiscal manipulation as exchange rate flexibility and trade openness vary. As capital mobility and exchange rate flexibility increase, the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation declines.
As a result, the amount of expenditures needed to achieve reelection, and hence the costliness of preelectoral fiscal manipulation, increases. This is captured by the denominator in equation 3, in which exchange rate flexibility (E) ranges from zero to one (E: [0,1]), where zero represents a fully fixed exchange rate and one represents a fully flexible exchange rate. K represents partially mobile capital, which ranges between zero and one (K: (0,1)), but is never perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile.
Capital mobility increases as K approaches one, and declines as K approaches zero.
Turning to the real exchange rate appreciation effect of fiscal manipulation on the domestic economy, how fiscal manipulation affects the real exchange rate determines how beneficial fiscal manipulation is to the domestic economy. When the exchange rate is fixed, an increase in fiscal manipulation leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As the real exchange rate appreciates, the cost of domestically produced goods vis-à-vis international goods increases, reducing the international competitiveness of domestic producers. To the extent that the economy is involved in international trade, domestic producers will no longer be able to compete as effectively against foreign producers; as a result, their ability to sell their product will decline. A drop in the purchase of domestically produced goods will offset the growth accruing to the domestic economy through fiscal manipulation. The size of this effect depends upon how much the government spends (which is a function of the effectiveness of fiscal manipulation, captured in the denominator of equation 3), how exposed the economy is to international trade (T), and how fixed the exchange rate is (E). This real exchange rate appreciation effect is captured by the numerator in equation 3.
In addition to the terms described above, equation 3 also contains a modifying constant, a.
Technically, this term serves to differentiate the size of the effects of T (the trade openness term in equation 2) and E (the exchange rate term in the denominator of equation 3), which both have modifying constants normalized to one, from the effect of T (1-E) in the numerator of equation 2. Substantively, a captures the relative importance of the real exchange rate effect on the government's utility-as a increases, the real exchange rate appreciation effect increases in importance vis-à-vis the effectiveness and compensation effects. 
From these partial derivatives, two key comparative statics emerge. First, when the exchange rate is flexible (E=1), government utility from fiscal manipulation increases as trade openness increases.
Second, as exchange rate flexibility declines (↓ E), the utility the government derives from increased trade openness declines. Taking these two comparative statics together, how far the government's utility declines as trade openness increases and exchange rate flexibility decreases depends upon the value of a, substantively, on the relative importance of the real exchange rate effect. When a<K -1 and the exchange rate is fixed, an increase in trade openness increases the government's utility from fiscal manipulation, but at a much reduced rate than when the exchange rate is flexible. In contrast, when a> K -1 , an increase in trade openness decreases the government's utility from fiscal manipulation. The greater is capital mobility (as K approaches 1) the more likely it is that a> K -1
. What this suggests is that as capital mobility increases, the real exchange rate effect is likely to matter more to the government. For the hypotheses presented in this paper and tested in the empirical analysis, I assume that a> K -1 . This is an empirical question. If a< K -1 , Hypothesis 2 will not hold, and will be falsified in the empirical analysis. 
